Over-the-Counter Securities Markets by Clinton, Guy L.
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 4 Article 9
6-1-1948
Over-the-Counter Securities Markets
Guy L. Clinton
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review
by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guy L. Clinton, Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 1 Vanderbilt Law Review 602 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol1/iss4/9
COMMENTS
OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MARKETS
I
REGULATION OF SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
Following the 1929 collapse, much attention has been centered on the
role of the security exchanges in our economy. Whether or not improper oper-
ation of the securities markets had caused the instability of the national econ-
omy was not clearly apparent. However, as many persons believed that such,
was the case, or that such operation was at least a major factor in the economic
ills of the country, the "crash" and tihe resulting investigations provided the
impetus for a reform program in the investment banking segment of our
economy, and one phase of this program dealt with securities.
The Congress enacted legislation, providing for the establishment of a
Securities and Exchange Commission.' This Commission was clothed with
authority-to supervise the issuance, sale and trading of securities, the opera-
tion of the securities markets and the personnel of these markets. The Secur-
ities Act of 1933 2 was enacted to eliminate misrepresentations, deceit and
other fraudulent practices in the issuance and sale of new securities by re-
quiring that a full and fair disclosure be made of all material facts regarding
securities which are offered for sale to the public in interstate commerce. This
Act provides that, with certain exceptions, before a security may be offered
or sold, a registration statement must be filed with the Commission and that it
must be effective.
From the beginning of federal regulation it was recognized that control
of the national securities exchanges would not alone assure protection to
investors. To have omitted the over-the-counter markets from the regulatory
scheme would have to a large extent dissipated the benefits from the regula-
tion of the organized exchanges. The Congress therefore enacted the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 19343 to eliminate fraud, manipulation and other
-abuses in the trading of securities both on the organized exchanges and in the
over-the-counter markets. Because of the lack of information regarding the
nature and problems of the over-the-counter markets at the time this Act was
passed, the Commission was granted such general powers of regulations as
1. 48 STAT. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1941).
2. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1941).
3. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1941).
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were "necessary or appropriate in the public interest.., to insure to investors
protection comparable to that provided ... in the case of national securities
exchanges." 4 As a result of the recommendations made by the Commission,
this Act was amended in 1936. and 1938. 5 These amendments have greatly
increased the power of the Commission to regulate over-the-counter transac-
tions.
Securities transactions in the over-the-counter markets .are regulated by
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It is the purpose of
this comment to deal with some of the specific problems encountered in the
registration of over-the-counter brokers and dealers, the transactions in such
markets and the organization and function of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.
NATURE OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS
The over-the-counter markets are sometimes referred to as the unorgan-
ized securities markets in which there is no concentration of traders but where
there are meetings of individual supply and demand as contrasted with the
organized markets on the national exchanges, where there are meetings of
collective supply and demand. They have also been referred to as the "irregu-
lar markets," although recognized to be in some cases fairly well organized.
The activity in these markets consists of an uncounted number. of separate
transactions of which no publicized record is kept and where there is no gen-
eral information available either as to the volume or price in any given trans-
action. Each firm which participates in over-the-counter trading relies upon
independently acquired information as to what other firms are buying and
selling or are likely to buy and sell. As there are no published records of the
various .transactions,'no -ticker services and no control agencies where the in-
vesting public can check the prices at which securities are currently selling,
it must rely on whatever ask and bid quotations are circulated and published.6
Some dealers circulate bid and asked quotations among other dealers for the
purpose of stimulating business and these are private services which enable
the over-the-counter houses to make their quotations available to one another.
At the present time the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., fur-
nishes quotations on unlisted securities. The various quotations of the average
bid and asked prices which are published in local and national newspapers,
though they constitute the public's only readily available source of informa-
4. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1941).
5. 49 STAT. 1377 (1936), 52 STAT. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1941).
6. Price quotations distributed by the National Quotation Bureau, Inc., are for the
confidential use of brokers' artiddealers and the public cannot subscribe.
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tion, do not purport to represent the highest bids and the lowest offerings
available at the time, but are merely offers and bids between which it is be-
lieved that sales of such securities may be made.
In quality the over-the-counter issues range from the highest grade bonds
to the most speculative stocks. However, there are certain characteristics in-
herent in these informal markets which make them the natural media for
dealing in certain types of securities. Securities which have a limited distrib-
ution; small capitalization; high price; those which lack a speculative interest
and those which are highly desirable for the portfolios of insurance com-
panies, investment trust and institutional investors, will be found in these
markets. The securities of banks and insurance companies; institutions whose
public prestige would not survive the publicity of speculative onslaughts were
their issues bought and sold on an organized exchange; the obligations of the
federal and various state governments and municipalities are sold almost ex-
clusively over-the-counter. Securities of corporations which wish to avoid
regulation under the Securities Act of 1933, may also be found in these mar-
kets.
In these over-the-counter markets will be found not only persons who
have the- same varied interests as those who engage in transactions on the
organized exchanges but also individuals who are seeking investments in se-
curities which cannot be obtained on those exchanges. Individuals who deal in
huge blocks of securities and individuals who seek the secrecy of those markets
to avoid liability will be found here also.
Although there are no reliable statistics with respect to the volume of
trading, there is reason to believe that both the value of the total issues dealt
in and the volume of such issues are enormous and that the volume of trading
far exceeds that of the securities listed or admitted to unlisted trading priv-
ileges on the organized exchanges. However, as many of the securities dealt
in are those of small concern, the dollar value of the securities listed on the
exchanges is undoubtedly greater than those traded in the over-the-counter
markets.
III
REGISTRATIOx REQUIREMENTS
At the present time there are two types of control or supervision exer-
cised over these markeis. The first type of control centers on the restriction
of mailing facilities; the other type, which will be discussed later, emphasizes
self-policing.
All brokers or dealers who use the mails or any means or instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce to effect any transaction, or who induce either
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the purchase or sale of a security otherwise than on a national securities ex-
change are required to register with the Commission, unless such activities
are in "exempted" 7 securities or in commercial paper.8 Those dealers and
brokers whose business is exclusively 9 intrastate are not required to register
with the Commission. Before a broker or dealer may be registered, it is nec-
essary to submit an, application to the Commission "which shall contain suh
information in such detail ... as the Commission may ...require . . ." 10
Except as otherwise provided, registration is effective thirty days after the
receipt of the application by the Commission.
The old concept that registration would be required where one was
making or creating a market for both the purchase and sale of any security,
except in, the exempt securities was abandoned, in favor of the test that the
use of any means of interstate commerce to effect or induce either the pur-
chase or sale, otherwise then on a national exchange, determines the necessity
for registration. This greatly increased the authority and control of the Com-
mission over this segment of the security transactions. For registration pur-
poses therefore it is the scope of the business rather than the character of the
market for the securities in which the broker-dealer is engaged that determines
whether be is exempt from registration or not.
IV
GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OR REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION
The Commission has authority by order to deny, suspend, revoke or can-
cel registration of any broker or dealer. The Commission has held that al-
though Section 27 of the Act gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over violations of the Act," this does not deprive the Commission of jurisdic-
tion to conduct such proceedings as are provided for by Section 15 or of any
other administrative proceedings which are provided for by the Act.12 The
Commission has authority to postpone the effective date of registration for
a period not to exceed fifteen days 1-: and such time may be extended after
7. See Rules X-15A-1, 2 and 3 where the Commission has accorded exemption to
certain securities. The reference to rules made in this comment will be to the rules promul-
gated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
8. The term as used here includes the "commercial paper, banker's acceptances or
commercial bills" as exempted by § 15 (a).
9. Originally those persons whose transactions were predominately in intrastate
commerce were exempt from registration. Section 15, 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §
'78 (1941).
10. 48 STAT. 885 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1941).
11. Sectibn 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that "The district
courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title . . .and of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
title....Y
12. Walton & Co., 5 S.E.C. 112 (1939).
13. Note 10 supra.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
and hearing before the Commission will issue an order either granting or de-
nying the application.
The Commission's authority is to be exercised only after appropriate
notice and opportunity for hearing has been given. The Commission has held
that the "appropriate notice" required, may be given by registered mail or
confirmed telegram. At the present time, the application form used in request-
ing registration includes a statement 14 which gives consent to such notices.
The Commission has held that a registered letter forwarded to the address
shown, although returned "Unclaimed" or "Cannot be found" did not impair
.the sufficiency of such notice, because of the consent given when the applica-
tion form was signed and that such letter nevertheless was adequate notice.16
Where there is actual notice, the Commission may take any action it deems
necessary, and it may issue an order denying or revoking registration whether
the respondent appears before the Commission or not.16 However, where there
is no actual notice given to the respondent, the Commission in one case, al-
though if found that there was evidence which might warrant revocation,
stated that "there is no evidence in the record indicating that the violation is
willful' and since the respondent did not appear the Commission stated that
"we withhold our final findings in this matter until he comes in to be heard." 17
In almost all instances, before disciplinary action can be taken it is
necessary that there be a finding that the violation was "willful." The Com-
mission has stated that "a violation to be 'willful' as that term is used in Sec-
tion 15(b) . does not mean that.the respondent must be aware of the
fact that he is violating the law; he may willfully violate the law even though
he is ignorant of the legal consequences of his act." 18 Where a respondent
was required to submit certain reports and he was at the time under a tem-
porary injunction and his records were in the possession of the state, the Com-
mission held that his failure to submit the reports as required was "willful." 19
Where the violations are the result of conduct marked by a careless disregard
14.-The application form states in part, "the registrant (or applicant) consent that
notice of any proceedings before the Commission in connection with this application or
with registration hereunder may be given by sending such notice by registered mail or
confirmed telegram to the person named before, at the address given."
15. Charles Fletcher Baxter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3901, Jan. 8,
1947; accord, Henry Leach, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3877, 1946; Trusteed
Collateral Corp., 3 S.E.C. 144 (1938); Lewis S. Parsons, 2 S.E.C. 199 (1937); Gerald
Owens, I S.E.C. 416 (1936).
'16. Trusteed Collateral Corp., 3 S.E.C. 144 (1938).
17. Herman Lucas, 4 S.E.C. 33, 34 (1938); accord, J. Albert Haines, 4 S.E.C. 31
(1938). In both cases the Commission did suspend the registrant's right to use the
mails and instruments of interstate commerce in securities transactions, pending final
determination.
18. Herbert R. May, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4061, at p. 7, March 12,
1948; accord, Harry Marks, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3906, 1947. Cases col-
lected at p. 14; Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
19. Sylvan Perry Spies, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3900, Jan. 8, 1947.
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as to whether or not one had the right to act, the Commission will always hold
that such violations are "willful."
The Commission will consider the conduct of.a registrant, prior to his
registration, in determining whether revocation is or is not in the public in-
terest.20 In considering whether or not registration should be granted after
a prior revocation and a previous denial of registration, the Commission in
granting registration, reviews the record "as it relates to his future trust-
worthiness and the need, if any, for protecting the public interest by con-
tinuing to exclude him. . .. -21 The Commission has on occasion .granted
registration subject to certain conditions, inter alia, that such person act only
as an agent in transactions with the public. 22 Once the Commission has de-
termined that there is a violation and that it is "willful," it must then .con-
sider what action is necessary "in the public interest" to protect the investing
public.23 This test of what is "in the public interest" is probably the most
elusive standard yet devised by the legislature or applied by an administrative
tribunal.
Under the present rules, registration once effective is continuous al-
though it is subject to cancellation, suspension or revocation by the Com-
mission and the registrant may withdraw from registration upon giving ap-
pr6priate notice and subject to certain conditions imposed by the Commis-
sion.24 The Commission has pointed out that the revocation of registration
"would not forever preclude him or any firm of which he is a member from
applying some time in the future for registration." 25 As the individuals en-
gaged in trading in the over-the-counter markets have become more and more
familiar with the scope of securities legislation and the application of the
various rules, some few of these persons have attempted in devious way io
thwart its intended purpose. As a result of these few individuals seeking new
and novel methods of accomplishing their fraudulent purposes, the work of
the Commission is necessarily dynamic in nature. A few of the problems with
which the Commission is constantly faced in determining the advisability of
registering an applicant or revoking registration will now be briefly considered.
20. Benard J. Johnson, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3729, Aug. 31, 1945.
21. George Lewis Ohstrom, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3498 at p. 3, Oct.
28, 1943. Healy, dissenting.
22. Charles A. Massie, Securities Exchange Release Act. No. 3641, 1945; Charles
A. Massie, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3660, 1945.
23. Where the Commission had determined that the respondent had "'illfully" vio-
lated the Securities Act of 1933 and was enjoined from engaging in the securities busi-
ness in one state, it stated that "under Section 15(b) ... . these findings constitute a basis
for revocation if, in addition, we find revocation in the public interest." Edwin W. Shaw,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3988 at p. 4, Aug. 29, 1947.
24. See Rule X-15 B-6.
25. M. S. Wien & Company,. -Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3873 at p. 3,
Nov. 5, 1946.
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(a) Material Fact
Where the applicant or other persons has 26 prior or subsequent to reg-
istration willfully made or caused to be made in any document or proceeding
before the Commission any statement which in the light of the then existing
circumstances was false or misleading with respect to any material fact, the
Conimission may deny or revoke registration.27 The Commission has held
that an address was to be considered a material fact and registration has been
denied where one willfully refused to disclose his correct business and res-
idence address in the application.2 8 A failure to report a change of address is
also a material fact.29 As this indicium would seem to indicate clearly the
scope of the interpretation, it is deemed to be sufficient to say that any fact
which the Commission may require in order to maintain adequate supervision
over registrants will be construed to be a material fact.30
(b) Prior Criminal Convictions
Where the applicant or registrant or other party has been convicted with-
in ten years prior to the date of the application or registration on a charge in-
volving the purchase or sale of, securities or arising out of the conduct of the
securities business, such is expressly stated to be grounds for denial or re-
vocation of registration.3 ' In construing this provision the Commission has
held that where a registrant pleaded nolo contendere to an indictment charging
a felony involving the purchase and sale of securities and the court passed
sentence on such plea, that this person had been "convicted" within the mean-
ing of this provision.32 Where one had been convicted by a state for selling
securities without a license registration was denied.33 The Commission has
nevertheless granted registration where the one applying had been convicted
of a felony involving the fraudulent sale of securities.34 In this case the evi-
dence indicated that the applicant was not a principal in the fraudulent trans-
action. The Commission stated that it may, "Consistently with the public in-
terest, permit registration to become effective." 35
26. This term is used to include "any partner, officer, director, or branch manager...
(or any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), or any person
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by such broker or dealer." Sec. 15(b).
27. Sec. 15(b) (A).
28. Harry George Ames, 1 S.E.C. 250 (1936) ; accord, Industrial Engineering Co.,
1 S.E.C. 486 (1936), S. J. Barlett, 1 S.E.C. 236 (1935).
29. See Herman Lucas, 4 S.E.C. 33 (1938).
30 Willful failure by applicants to give the names previously used or by which they
were previously known is a ground for revocation. B. W. Sargent, 2 S.E.C. 310 (1937).
31. Sec. 15(b) (B).
32. Leo G. Siesfeld, 11 S.E.C. 746 (1942).
33. Harry H. Natanson, 1 S.E.C. 852 (1936). The Commission looking to his con-
duct subsequent to his conviction, held that it was in the public interest to deny the
application.
34. F. H. Winter & Company,.11 S.E.C. 122 (1942).
35. Jd. at 123, 124.
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(c) Injunctions
Registration may be denied or revoked where a party is permanently or
temporarily enjoined by order, judgment, or decree of any court of -compe-
tent jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct or-practice in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.3 6 Where the registrant
had been permanently enjoined by a state court from engaging in certain ac-
tivities the Commission held that revocation was in the public interest.3 7
Where the registrant had consented to the entry of a permanent injunction
by a court of competent jurisdiction, restraining him from engaging in and
continuing certain practices in the sale of securities, the Commission has
held that this decree could not be collaterally attacked in a proceeding involv-
ing the revocation of registration.3 8 The Commission has not denied registra-
tion where an injunction was not in effect at the time that the application was
filed.39 A subsequent request for registration has been granted where the
previous denial was grounded principally on a temporary injunction which
was in effect but was vacated prior to the second application.40
(d) Violation of Rules and Other Statutes
The over-the-counter markets perform three distinct functions: the pri-
mary distribution of new securities, the secondary distribution or the re-
distribution of large blocks of outstanding securities and the usual individual
trading of small numbers of shares. As a result of- the first function, brokers
and dealers are subject to the Securities Act of 1933 and any willful violation
of any provision of that Act 4' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or
any rule 42 promulgated under either Act in effecting this primary distribution
will be basis for the denial or rev6cation of registration, if such is found to
be in the public interest. The policy of the Securities Act of 1933 to provide
full disclosure of every essentially important point is applicable not only to
the distribution of a new issue but to the redistribution of outstanding secur-
ities which have "taken on the characteristics of a new offering by reason of
36. Sec. 15(b) (C).
37. Fischer & Company, 11 S.E.C. 911 (1942). Cf. Emmett R. Nawn, 11 S.E.C.
1107 (1942).
38. James F. Morrissey, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3920, March 6, 1947.
Cf. S.E.C. v. Jones, 85 F. 2d 17 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936).
39. Gerald Owens, 1 S.E.C. 416 (1936).
40. C. C. Wilson, 1 S.E.C. 502 (1936).
41. For case involving the question as to what is a "single issue" see Herbert R.
fay, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4061, March 12, 1948. For case involving
interpretation of scope of words "sale" and "offer to buy" see Van Alstyne, Noel & Co.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3791, Feb. 28, 1946.
42. For failure to comply with the provisions of Rule X-15 C1-9, in the preparation
of a pro forma balance sheet, which deceived a purchaser as to the time condition of the
issues, and the revocation of registration for such failure see Leedy, Wheeler & Com-
pany, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3593, July 27, 1944.
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the control of the issuer possessed by those responsible for the offering." 4.1
Where there was no registration of securities in connection with a secQndary
-distribution through underwriters, the Commission suspended the respondent
from NASD for the failure to register this secondary distribution, holding
-that the brokerage exemption of Section 4 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933
-was inapplicable to a distribution over a national exchange by an underwriter
acting for a party who controlled the issuer.44 The same result would doubt-
less follow where the redistribution was made exclusively in the over-the-
,counter markets.
V
CONTROL OF ACTIVITY IN THE OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS
Under thd ideal operation of the over-the-counter markets, anyone who
is ignorant of the intrinsic merit of a security would pay a price which would
-not differ greatly from the worth of such security as estimated by many in-
formed investors. Congress, in order to establish such an ideal operation, has
by Section 15(c) attempted to prevent fraud, deceit and manipulation and to
afford the same protection to securities traded in the over-the-counter mar-
kets as is afforded to those securities dealt in on the national securities ex-
changes. Brokers and dealers who are required to register under the Act
and those who are not required to register are prohibited from using the chan-
nels of interstate commerce to engage in any transaction by means of any
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative device "to effect any transaction or to
induce the purchase or sale of any security . . . otherwise then on a national
securities exchange . . . ." 45 Brokers and dealers are also forbidden to use
the channels of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in or to induce
or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any security in connection with
which such person engages in any act or practice which is fraudulent, de-
ceptive or manipulative or to make fictitious quotations.4 6
In view of the purpose of Section 15, the Commission originally took
the view that this was sufficient authority to extend to the over-the-counter
markets the same protection as was afforded to those securities regulated by
Section 9 of the Act. The Commission published a rule which crystallized
this viewpoint. However, the rule was suspended in so far as it applied to
over-the-counter securities.47 The Commission has continued to maintaii that
43. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
44. Ira Haupt & Company, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3845, Aug. 20,
1946.
45. Sec. 15(c) (1). Commercial paper, banker's acceptances and commercial bills are
exempted from this provision.
46. Sec..15(c) (2). In addition to the exemptions granted in Sec. 15(c) (1), any
.exempted security is also exempted by this provision.
47. Rule G b 4, later renumbered X-10 B-4 S.E.C.
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the substantive law was unchanged by the suspension of this rule and that
transactions in unregistered securities, which would be violations of Section
9 if in registered securities, are equally illegal under Section 15(c) (1) and
that such transactions were illegal at common law.48 The Commission later
adopted Rule X-15 (c) 1-2 49 which appears to be all inclusive. The Commis-
sion has taken the view that although this rule is based on fraud and deceit,
that the fraud concept is broad enough to match the statutory prohibitions
relating to listed securities.
The various types of fraudulent activities in the purchase and sale of
securities such as matched orders, wash sales and other fraudulent schemes
which were previously prosecuted in this country under the common law
of fraud and deceit and the mail fraud statutes are now prosecuted as well
under Section 15(c), when such trading is in the over-the-counter markets.
Because of the lack of publicity wash sales and matched orders are difficult
to detect in the over-the-counter markets and as there appear to be no prose-
cutions of such activity, they are excluded from consideration in this com-
ment. The violations of the Act and the rules of the Commission that are of
most importance concern those involving manipulation by volume buying
and selling, problems of prevailing market prices, secret profits and price
maintenance and stabilization.
(a) Manipulation
In Rex v. DeBerehiger, an early English case 50 dealing with the raising
and lowering of prices the court stated that, "It may be admitted.., that the
raising or lowering the price of the public funds is not per se a crime. A man
may have occasion to sell out a large sum, which may have. the effedt of de-
pressing the price of stocks, or he may buy in a large sum, and thereby raise
the price on a particular day and yet he will be guilty of no offense." I The
court in that case held, however, that ".,. the end is- illegal, for it is to create
a temporary rise in the funds without any foundation, the necessary conse-
quence of which must be to prejudice all those who became purchasers during
the period of that fluctuation." 52 This question of improper purpose in the
48. See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 509, 531 (1947).
49. Rule X-15(c) 1-2 provides: "(a) The term 'mafiipulation, deceptive, or other
fraudulent device or contrivance' as used in Section,15(c) (1) of the Act, is hereby
defined to include any act, practice, or course of business which' operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any such person. (b) The term .'manipulation, decep-
tive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance' as used in Section 15(c) (1) of the Act,
is hereby defined to include any untrue statement of a material fdct and any omission
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, which statement or
omission is made with knowledge or reasonable grounds to" believe that it is untrue or
misleading." - -
50. 3 M.&S. 67 (1814). . .
51. Ibid. 73.
52. Ibid. 75. -
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execution of otherwise normal securities transactions was squarely raised
again in Scott v. Brown, a later English case. 53 Though there was nothing in
the case to suggest any objective abnormality in the intended purchases, be-
cause of the subjective element the purpose of the parties being to mislead the
public as to the market for the security, the contract was held to be fraudulent.
In United States v. Brown,5 4 a pool had agreed to raise the price of a security.
The court in holding this to be a fraud, stated in part, "Judges have properly
set their faces sternly against any practices by which the right of fair dealing
between man and man is in any way infringed, and, whenever there is any
false representation made by word or act in behalf of a pool for the purpose
of inducing the public to come into the market and buy securities, it is held
to be a fraud, and contracts between insiders are held to be illegal and against
public policy." There is no clear evidence that the doctrine of Scott v. Brown
was ever followed in this country,55 prior to the federal legislation. Prior to
the Act, the view seems to have been that in the absence of fraud, misrepre-
sentation or deceit, if the individuals were not connected with the corporation,
or had not in some way assumed obligations either to the market or to the in-
vestors in the corporation, that a group could purchase with the sole aim of
raising the price or could sell with the sole aim of depressing it and the law
would leave them alone. Prior to the securities legislation the intent of the
parties, on which the Engish view was grounded, was not controlling even
though the activity was apparently hurtful to the investing public.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 it is unlawful to effect a series
of transactions which will either raige or lower the price of a security "for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale" of such security by others. Therefore
the legallity of the acts of any person, who in his trading affects the market
prices of a security, is determined by his intent. Intent alone will determine
whether such person is guilty of manipulation or not. Manipulation has been
defined as the generic term which is used to identify the employment of
artificial stimuli for the primary purpose of controlling the prices or the
volume of transactions or securities traded on the exchanges.5 6
In the first two cases 67 involving over-the-counter manipulations prose-
cuted under this Act, the dealers who were quoting the stock in the National
Quotation Service and newspapers, edged up their bids and actually purchased
stock on a rising price scale, thus effectively raising the market price prepara-
tory to a public distribution of the same stock. The Commission held that
this conduct was the equivalent of a series of transactions raising the market
53. [1892] 2 Q.B.D. 724.
54. 5 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F. 2d 321 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).
55. 31 COL. L. REv. 264 (1931); 56 YALE L.J. 509, 517 (1947).
56. See Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 624 (1937).
57. Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941); 'Masland, 9 S.E.C. 338 (1941).
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price of registered securities to induce the purchase of such securities by others
and violated Section 15(c) (1). The failure to disclose to purchasers that the
market price was so affected was a violation of Rule X-15C 1-2 and therefore
a violation of Section 15(c) (1). "Though buying or selling in volume upon
an exchange is not at present defined as a manipulative device, although
definite price changes may result, it is not altogether settled that mere buying
in volume is not per se manipulation when there is knowledge that prices will
be affected." 58 Though objectively the acts may be the same, the sole distinction
between the legality and illegality of such acts is the purpose for which they
are undertaken. The definition of the word "purpose" has not been clearly
established. f n the Congressional Committee hearings it was said to be
synonymous with intent. It is apparent, however, that the term is less inclusive
than the specific intent of the criminal law which is strictly defined as the
knowledge which a reasonable man has or should have in the light of sur-
rounding circumstances, that certain consequences will follow as a result of
his acts. Though the trading by one may cause others to enter the market and
raise the price and this consequence is agreeable to the purchaser this is not
the decisive element. The Act does not, without showing of the intent to induce
others to come into the market, prohibit such activity. That others enter the
market may be incidental to an underlying aim of securing a profit from antici-
pated price changes caused by the "natural" force which makes prices. In
manipulation, the principal object and the immediate end to which the activity
is directed, is the inducing of others to trade in such securities. It is this sub-
jective difference in the primary objective that constitutes the line, often a
tenuous one, dividing the legal from the illegal. In the determination of the
subjective element of "purpose," 59 this may mean no more than a provable
motive of financial interest in a higher or lower market. It has been suggested
that "if a dealer has a financial interest in a higher price for a security it might
be prudent for him either to drop his trading altogether or else to limit it to
what might be termed 'stabilization'; for if his trading does raise the price,
his purpose will be suspect, and he may be charged with manipulation." 60
Another situation which involves manipulation through actual buying and
selling is that of "market sponsorship." Although in a broad sense the whole
structure of the over-the-counter trading is built on market sponsorship, there
are two situations where an over-the-counter broker-dealer finds its profitable
to "make a market" for particular issues. The first is in small issues, where
58. S.E.C. v. Andres, 88 F. 2d 441 (C.C.A. 2d 1937); see Comment, 46 YALE L.J.
624,629 (1937).
59. See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 624 (1947) and for "proof of the purpose" see 46
YALE L.J. 624, 633-8 (1937); 38 COL. L. REv. 393, 406 (1938) ; 47 YALE L.J. 622, 643(1939).
60. 10 GEo. WAsm. L. Rsv. 639, 651 (1942).
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trading is infrequent and where there is no continuous market for the security.
In this situation, in order to produce a liquidity for such securities, the broker-
dealers buy the securities and-then later "create a market" in order to dispose
of them. In such a situation a great degree of control over the volume of trad-
ing and the price of such security may be exercised by the broker-dealer by
varying the ratio of his buying volume to his selling volume. In the second
situation, although there may be volume trading, if there is a sudden increased
demand for these securities and the broker-dealer, in order to replenish his
own depleted supply of such securities, attempts to persuade those persons
holding such securities to sell, in doing so he is "creating a market." In both
of these situations, the price paid for such securities will represent the judg-
ment of the broker-dealer rather than the independent judgment of a large
number of investors. Here again, the legality of what may appear to be an
otherwise daily routine will be the underlying motive of the broker-dealer in
consummating such transaction. If the prices at which such purchases and sales
occurred did not reasonably approximate the market value of such security,
this would be considered manipulation. The Commission has held these pro-
hibitions against manipulations are directed not only against the defrauding of
unwary investors but with equal force against the impediments to a free and
open market created by artificial stimulants or restraints.6 1 Where one creates
a market, the Commission has held that even if there was no misrepresentation
as to the existence of the market and one merely states the price at which he
was willing to do business, this would still be a violation of Rule X-15 (c) 1-2
in omitting to state the material fact that he was "making the market," and
therefore such is a violation of Section 15 (c).62
(b) Prevailing Market Price
The problem as to what price, a broker-dealer may charge for the secur-
ities he buys or sells has no clearly defined answer. The test that is applied is
whether such was reasonable with regard to the prevailing market price. The
Commission has held that "a statement by a broker or dealer with respect to
the price of a security carries with it the implied representation that such price
bears some reasonable relationship, to the prevailing market price." This
prevailing market price as of any given day is extremely difficult to ascertain,
since the actual ask and bid prices which would be available for such time rep-
resent merely the prices between which it is believed business may be trans-
acted. In the Allender case,63 the Commission discussed the probative weight
of the National Daily Quotation Sheets, and indications of the market price
61. Masland, 9 S.E.C. 338 (1941).
62. Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975, 980 (1942), accord, Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386
(1939).
63. 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1057..(19.41).
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of securities among wholesalers which is in turn used as an indication of the
market prices in retail transactions. When evidence of the prevailing market
price is lacking, the Commission has held that a dealer is under a duty to con-
fine himself to a reasonable mark-up over wholesale levels and that his con-
temporaneous purchase price at wholesale would be taken as a prima facie.
indication of the prevailing wholesale price. It is necessary to consider the cost
to the broker or dealer, since that may or may not be the same as the prevailing
market price, depending upon the fluctuations of the market after the date the
broker-dealer purchased the security; the term "cost" and "prevailing market
price" may well be different figures. In considering whether a price is a "fair"
price, this will be determined to some extent by the "mark-up." The term
"mark-up" is used to refer to the spread between the prevailing market
price and the sales price to the public. 64 The NASD at one time adopted a
policy that five per cent would be considered the mark-up which did not
violate high standards of ethical conduct which it had established for securities
dealers.65 The application of this five per cent mark-up has been consistently
rejected by. the Commission, and the Commission has never laid down any
arbitrary standard for the measure of a fair and just mark-up.
A broker-dealer is under a duty to advise the purchaser of the market
price of the security, 66 the various charges and the capacity in which he is' deal-
ing with such person. It may be impossible for him to deal with such person in
more than one capacity. A broker is required by the rules of the Commission 67
to make disclosures as to the source and amount of his compensation, the date
and time of the transaction and the name of the other party. The concealment
of the market price may be achieved by fraudulently representing that the
sales were at the market, by a passive omission to state the market price or by
taking active steps to see that the purchaser remained ignorant of -the prevail-'
ing market price. In one such case involving this latter type- of fraudulent
authority, the registrant requested that an organized exchange dealer not send
into the state in which the respondent was doing business any quotations on
certain securities.68 The. Commission has repeatedly held that no broker or
dealer could exploit the ignorance of customers or their confidence in him and
that he may not charge them prices which bear no reasonable relationship to
the market.
64. Lawrence R. Leeby, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3450, 1943.
65. Letter of NASD to members dated Oct. 25, 1943.
66. S.E.C. has no authority to adopt a rule requiring general disclosure of prevailing
market quotations *here transactions are in "exempted sectrities," as they are spe-
cifically excluded from § 15(c) (2). Securities Exchange Release Act No. 3940 (April 2,
1947).
67. Rule X-15C1-4. This rule, however, does not insure complete investor protection
as such disclosure may be tnde after'thi" customer's agreement to the transaction.
68. Guaranty Underwritierg;" Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3481, 'SepLi.
11, 1943.
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In addition to the actual mark-up, the Commission will look to all of the
surrounding circumstances and will give great weight to the disclosure. In a
case 69 where the respondent was not charged with fraud nor with the violation
of any rule or statute, but where such party was appealing from disciplinary
action taken against him by NASD, the Commission was presented squarely
with the reasonableness of the mark-up which admittedly ranged from over
four per cent to over eleven per cent above the cost price. The firm was engaged
in the so-called riskless transactions for the most part, that is, acting as princi-
pal, the firm purchased securities only after it had received the order from the
customer. The evidence disclosed that the salesmen had made full disclosure
to the customers at the time the order was received as to the capacity in which
the firm would act and that the price to the customer would include a mark-up
over the cost price stated in terms of points 70 to the nearest one-eighth of a
point. Such disclosure was also made on the written confirmation which was
sent immediately after the firm's purchase. In this case the Commission empha-
sized that the disclosure made jby the respondent was to be taken into considera-
tion in determining whether there had been a violation of business ethics, stat-
ing that "while an undisclosed mark-up which is not so excessive as to con-
stitute fraud might nevertheless violate business ethics, it does not follow
that the same mark-up, accompanied by a full disclosure, is always a violation
of business ethics." 71 The Commission stated that it would consider "not only
the size of the mark-up but ... all pertinent circumstances, including disclo-
sure, bearing on its reasonableness.... .1 72 The Commission, after considering
the general conduct of the firm's business, including the special advisory 73
service rendered customers, held that there was no breach of business ethics.
The Commission requires 74 that a broker disclose in his confirmations 76
"the source and amount" of any commission or other remuneration, and this
must be done "at or before the completion of the transaction" 76 in connection
with the transaction confirmed. A confirmation which did not disclose to
customers the price which the firm paid for the securities and did not itemize
69. Herrick, Waddell & Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3935, March
25, 1947.
70. The Commission commented on this and stated that it believed that disclosure
in terms of dollars and cents would in most cases be more helpful than disclosure in
points, but the method as such was not condemned.
71. Herrick, Waddell & Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3935 at p.
9, March 25, 1947.
p72. Ibid.
73. Only if such service is incidental to the conduct of the business and no special
compensation is received, is a broker-dealer exempt from registration as an Investment
Adviser. Sec. 202(a) (11) (C) Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 54 STAT. 847 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80 (1941).
74. Rule X-15 C 1-4.
75. See note 67 supra.
76. For the disclosure of the information as required by Rules X-15 C 1-4, 5 and 6 "at
or before completion of the transaction" see article by David Saperstein in the Fina~cial
Reporter, Sept. 9, 1937.
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the fees was held not to comply with the rules and for this and other violations
registration was revoked. 77 Confirmation as principal without disclosing either
the commissions or profits enabled one respondent to conceal the substantial
profits which it derived from the "churning" of the customer's account.7s It
is well settled that by the mere form of the words employed as a confirmation,
a broker cannot transform himself into a principal at will. 79 Where the ele-
ments of agency exist only the specific and informed consent of the customer
is sufficient to change such a relationship.
The duty of disclosure has been placed on broker-dealers in other situ-
ations than that of disclosure of information to the persons with whom they
are directly dealing. The Commission has held that where purchases of se-
curities by corporate "insiders" operate as a fraud and deceit upon the sell-
ers,80 that under such circumstances if a broker-dealer representing such "in-
siders" has full knowledge of the concealment of the information and the abuse
of the insiders' position, that the broker-dealer is charged with an affirmative
duty to make appropiiate disclosure to the sellers or to dissociate himself from
the fraud. Failure to take such action when dealing with one who had discre-
tionary powers over customers' accounts, has been held to be in violation of 15
(c) (1) and the rules promulgated under such 'provision.8' This duty of the
broker-dealer is dependent upon his "knowledge." The Commission has stated
that in the absence of a clear and unequivocal admission "we are compelled
to accept conduct as its only true index. Such evidence is inherently circum-
stantial in nature and we must, therefore, consider all the facts together with
such inferences as may properly be drawn, to determine whether a finding can
be made that respondent had such knowledge." 82
(c) Secret Profits
The severity with which the Commission has dealt with those respondents
who have been found to have made secret profits should prove to be an ade-
quate deterrent for such conduct by brokers and dealers. As an agent is liable
for any secret profits, regardless of how small they may be, any question as
77. Investment Registry of America, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
3772, Jan. 10, 1946.
78. Behel, Johnsen & Company, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3967,
June 24, 1947.
79. Oxford Company, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3769, Jan. 3, 1946.
80. Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3445, 1943.
81. Hay, Fales & Company, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3697, June 7, 1945;
cf. Alexander Smith, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3785, Feb. 5, 1946.
82. Hughes & Treat, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3811, at p. 7, April 24;
1946. The Commission found that the respondent had no such knowledge. Cf. Burley &
Company, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3838, Aug. 5, 1946. Where one assisted
in effecting transactions with dummy accounts carried with another firm and such person
failed to keep proper records of such transactions, the Commission held that such
individual "had reason to know" of the fraudulent transactions.
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to the relationship of cost price to the market price in these cases is immaterial.
Where the Commission found that the respondent had been deducting from
the amounts due to customers, charges for commissions purportedly paid to
exchange brokers, when in fact the sales had actually been made directly to
other customers of the respondent firm, such practice of making secret profit
was held to be grounds for revocation. 83 Where the respondent advertised that
its fee for "selecting" securities was five per cent of the purchase price or
less, the Commission held that charges which ran as high as nine per cent were
excessive and that such were secret profits.84 Where a partner of the respon-
dent firm established accounts with another firm and caused such other firn
to purchase securities for these accounts, which the respondent firm thereupon.
bought at increased prices as agent for its customers, the Commission held
that as such partner had not revealed his personal interest in the transaction
that such was a secret profit.85 In one case where the customers had given their
consent, the respondent sold their securities and purchased with the proceeds
other securities which he had recommended. In the acquisition of the recom-
mended securities, respondent purportedly purchased them for its own account
and then sold them to the customers at a profit, confirming the sale as a princi-
pal. Following such a pattern for a three year period, the capital in three of the
accounts with which the respondent had dealt had been turned over four and
one-half times. The Commission held that this "churning" was motivated by a,
single purpose-to produce large profits for the respondent. The Commission
stated that while "'churning' may occur where a firm confirms as agent and
discloses its commissions ... the registrant's practice of confirming as princi-
pal... facilitated perpetration of the ... fraud .... 86 To determine whether
or not there has been a "churning" and a taking of secret profits, the Com-
mission will look to see whether the transactions are excessive in size and
frequency in the light of the financial resources in the customer's account.
Where dummy accounts were established with another firm and the trading
through these accounts permitted the active partner of the respondent to,
make secret profits, the Commission revoked the registration of the respondent
firm, even though the respondent had made restitution of the secret profits and
also of the commissions it had received.87
A higher standard of fair dealing is imposed on those who deal with dis-
cretionary accounts than on others. Rule X-15 C 1-7(a) specifically defines
83. Knowledge of the fraudulent transactions. Investment Registry of America, Inc.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3772, Jan. 10, 1946. In order to prevent the fraudu-
lent results of cross-trading, the Commission by Rule X-15 C 1-4 requires that a broker
disclose or offer to disclose the other principal.
84. Ibid.
85. Burley & Company, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3838, Aug. 5, 1946.
86. Behel, Johnsen & Company, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3967, June
24, 1947.
87. Burley & Company, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3838, Aug. 5, 1946.
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"fraudulent device" to include excessive trading effected in discretionary ac-
,counts. However, the Commission has expressly pointed out that the fact that
the rule above applies only to discretionary accounts does not mean that exces-
•sive trading in an acdount which is not technically a discretionary account can
not constitute a violation of Rule X-15 C 1-2, as this rule expressly provides
-that its scope is not limited by any specific definitions or terms in other rules,
adopted pursuant to Section 15(c).. In-all the cases involving secret profits
the Commission has followed the common law, by requiring compliance with
all the fiduciary duties of agency 8
(d) Price Maintenance and Stabilization
In effectuating the purposes of the Act, one of which is to abolish any
artificial price, consideration of the question of stabilization raises a very diffi-
cult problem. The term "stabilization" as used generally as well as used in this
Act refers to that action regarding price changes, as distinguished from action
affirmatively initiating changes in price stabilization is forbidden in section 8
(h) (6) to the extent that such may be in contravention of the rules of the
Commission. Although the Power to regulate stabilization under this section
applied only to securities registered on national securities exchanges, the Coin-
mission has taken the position that the power given under Section 15 (c) to
define manipulative practices includes the power to regulate stabilization in
the over-the-counter markets. In the case of securities previously issued, the
Commission permits the "pegging" at any price previously reached without
manipulation. In case of a new issue, for which there has been no previous
market, the Commission will permit any interested person to create and support
a market at any price he deems expedient, even though such a "market" may
collapse when the support is withdrawn.8 9 Where the offering price of a new
issue is "at the market," any broker-dealer in any over-the-county market
who is engaged in stabilizing the price of that security, is prohibited froin
representing that such security is offered "bt the market," unless he has
grounds to believe that a "market" for such security exists other than made,
created or controlled by him.90 To safeguard shareholders and investors, the
Commission has gone into considerable detail in its regulation of the stabiliza-
tion activities connected with the offering of a registered security "at the mar-
ket."91 The Commission has also imposed very strict controls on the stabiliza-
88. Johnson v. Winslow, 155 Misc. 170, 279 N.Y. Supp. 147 (Stip. Ct. 1935), aff'd
tzere., 246 App. Div. 800, 285 N.Y. Supp. 1075 (1st Dep't 1936),,aff'd, 272 N.Y: 467, 3
N.E. 2d 872 (1936), reargument denied, 272 N.Y. 512, 4 N.E. 2d 423 (1936).
89. See n. 20, 10 Gzo. WAsH. L. REv. 639, 646 (1942).
90. Rule X-15 C 1-8.
91. 56 YALE L.J. 333 (1947) n: 81 at p. 348 and n. 102 at p. 353. For recent case
involving an attempted stabilization by one who controlled the issues and the registrant,
see The Federal Corporation, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3909, Jan. 29, 1947.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tion activities of underwriters and broker-dealers in all transactions relating
to stabilization of securities. Once an underwriter starts to stabilize a new se-
curity at some arbitrary level chosen by himself, he cannot thereafter raise the
price while still distributing the securities. Once a position is taken in a new
security, if the price drops for a time and in order to raise the market price
again to the "pegged" price such underwriter is forced to purchase shares of
that security, he is not permitted to sell any of this accumulated inventory un-
less he has remained out of the market until such time as the price of the
security is no longer affected by his previous activity. The Commission has
held that price maintenance agreements were impediments to a free market,9 2
and this position does not appear to be changed. 93 The Commission has taken
the position that price maintenance agreements are not per se in violation of
anti-trust laws, and that stabilization of securities has a proper function in
the activities of underwriters and broker-dealers in the issuance of securities.94
On the contrary, the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice has
maintained that price-fixing agreements are per se in violation of the Sher-
man Act.95 In view of these two conflicting views of two very power-
ful governmental agencies, the future legality of price maintenance agreements
and stabilization activities is certainly not free from doubt.
VI. THE NATIONAL AssOcIATIoN or SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.
The Congress has provided for a system of cooperative regulation of the
over-the-counter markets, through the activities of voluntary associations of
dealers and brokers who are doing business in these markets.96 Certain stand-
ards are established for the registration of these self-regulatory groups either
as a national securities association or as an affiliated securities association.
Among these requirements are that such association must be either nation wide
in scope or representative of some economically cohesive region. As the Con-
gress intended that the regulation of the over-the-counter markets should be
achieved in part through the efforts of such an association, it is necessary that
such an association be capable of discharging this duty before it may be regis-
tered with the Commission as either a national or affiliated association. There
is no requirement that such an association must be registered with the Commis-
sion, and dealers and brokers are not prohibited from trading in securities in in-
92. NASD, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3700, June 11, 1945.
93. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2446, 1940. In approving the continuation of
stabilization activities under S.E.C. regulation, the Commission found that "there are
times when the 'freeplay' of the 'forces' of supply and demand may, if unrestricted, produce
socially or economically undesirable consequences."
94. The Commission has stated "our iew of both price maintenance contracts and
stabilization operations is that they are objectionable on principle but necessary under
existing conditions. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3700 at p. 38, June 11, 1945,
95. 56 YALF, L.J. 333, 340 (1947).
96. Sec. 15 A.
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terstate commerce in the over-the-counter markets in the-event no such associa-
tion is registered. At the present time there is only one such association in ex-
istence, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. which was granted
registration as a national association on August 9, 1939.97 This organization is
an outgrowth of the Investment Bankers Conference, Inc. The Commission
has stated that "In order that every reasonable opportunity may be afforded
such association or associations as may become registered . . . to exercise as
broad a regulatory function as possible, the Commission has refrained from
any substantial amplification of its own rules for regulation of over-the-
counter markets." 98 The over-the-counter brokers and dealers have a choice
either of joining the NASD and have some voice in making the rules that
govern them or to be regulated directly by the Commission.
(a) Organization and Purpose
The latest available figures as to membership in the NASD indicate that
there are 2,614 members of this organization."- The figure is probably some-
what over ninety percent of all those eligible for membership. Although mem-
bership in NASD is not a prerequisite to doing business in interstate com-
merce, as is registration with the Commission, those firms who are members of
the NASD are required to do business with any broker or dealer who is not a
member at the same prices, commissions and fees as are accorded to the general
public. As a result of this economic discrimination which is sanctioned by the
Act, 10 0 membership in NASD is almost imperative to the continuance of an
over-the-counter securities business. A source of income of many of the over-
the-counter firms is the commissions paid to them as members of selling groups
in the distribution of new securities. From this it will be seen that NASD
membership is essential to most brokers and dealers and their expulsion from
membership is almost tantamount to expulsion from the industry. This same
economic coercion to join the NASD, is used to insure full compliance with
the rules that the NASD or the Commission promulgates.,
The jurisdiction of NASD is limited to the over-the-counter markets. The
NASD is governed by District Committeemen and also by a Board of Gover-
nors. The establishment of rules of fair practice and their enforcement are the
most important activities of the NASD. The Quotation Committee has done
much to secure quotations of unlisted securities for publication in newspapers
97. Application by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 627(1939).
98 5 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 58 (1939).
99. 13 S.E.C. ANN,. REP. 49 (1947).
100. In the absence of legislative permission, this economic discrimination against
new members would probably be a violation of both the state and the federal anti-trust
laws. See Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission, 13 F.
2d 673 (C.C.A. 8th 1926).
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and financial publications and has done much to provide brokers and dealers
with information as to the prevailing market prices.
Any action by the NASD which establishes a rule, or any policy which
has the force and effect of a rule, must be submitted to the membership for
approval, as this is required by the NASD by-laws. Such rules must also be
submitted to the Commission for its approval' 0 l The Commission has held
that the NASD rules were broader than a mere prohibition against fraud.
With regard to the position of the NASD as stated in the "5 % letters," which
deal with the mark-up in prices that brokers or dealers could make without
violating the rules of the association, the Commission held that this policy was
not a rule nor had the effect of a rule, therefore the Commisison would not
abrogate or approve them on merits apart from individual cases where such
a policy was specifically applied. 0 2
(b) Membership
Any broker or dealer engaged in over-the-counter trading, who is reg-
istered with the Commission may be admitted to membership, unless such
firm is disqualified by the Act. The suspension or expulsion from membership
does not depend on willfudness but only on public policy. Any disciplinary
action by NASD either against a member or in denying membership to any
applicant is subject to review by the Commission. 0 3
Where there has been a previous revocation of registration by the Com-
mission NASD is not permitted to grant admission 104 unless such is ordered
by the Commission. Where one of the partners of the applicant who sought
membership in NASD had been expelled from membership in a national ex-
change more than five years before, the Commission in reviewing the NASD
action held that although there were no grounds for the denial of registration
by the Commission, that because the partner's previous conduct had been incon-
sistent with just and equitable principles of trade it would not be appropriate
to direct membership in the NASD.10 5 Later this applicant sought membership
in the NASD for the second time. The NASD reported to the Commission
that it would accept the applicant as a member, upon receiving the Commis-
sion's approval. The Commisison held that this applicant, who was within the
exclusionary category set forth in Section 15 A (b) (A) had a duty to present
101. Sec. 15 (A) (j).
102. Rules of the NASD, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3623, Nov. 25,
1944.
103. Sec. 15 (A) (g).
104. Sec. 15A(b) (4) and Section 2, Article E of the NASD by-laws, ba- from
NASD membership one who has been expelled from NASD for conduct inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade unless the Commission approves or directs such
admission.
105. T. A. Sisto & Co., 7 S.E.C. 647 (1940).
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facts to justify such admission and-had failed to do so.106 The Commissiorn
looked to evidence of the partner's conduct other than as a broker-dealer
to determine whether it would permit the firm membership in NASD.
One case 1 07 involving the denial of membership was decided on the issue
of whether or not such firm was disqualified from membership where the part-
ners of such firm had been officers, directors and shareholders of a broker-
dealer whose registration had been previously revoked. 08 The Commission
had granted registration of the applicant, but the NASD denied its applica-
tion for admission to membership on the ground that the partners of the appli-
cant had been "a cause" of the prior revocation. The Commission, in a review
of the action taken by NASD, held that where a broker-dealer whose registra-
tion had been revoked but was subsequently allowed by the Commission to be-
come registered, that the disqualification is removed in that he is no longer-
subject to an order of revocation and that such a firm is no longer disqualified.
The Commission issued an order "requiring" applicant's admission.109 The
Commission in this case held, however, that the individual of the firm making
application had not been "a cause" of the prior expulsion.
In another case 110 involving the denial of membership by the NASD the
Commission directed the applicant's admission on the ground that "under the
circumstances, it is incumbent upon the NASD, if we are to sustain its action
of disapproval, to present adequate reasons in addition to the disability arising
from the ... expulsion . *..." I" In this case, the Commission at the time it
granted registration to this applicant, for a limited purpose, clearly recognized
that a disability continued and here the person was held to have been "a cause'"
of the prior expulsion.
In a case where the firm was found guilty of a willful violation of the
Act, but because of extenuating circumstances the Commission did not revoke
the registration, but did suspend the firm from membership in NASD for
sixty days, the Commission denied a motion to shorten the period of such sus-
pension." 2 The Commission stated that it recognized that this suspension
would cause the firm to suffer a loss of business and that its organization
would be adversely affected, but that such were the natural consequences of
the remedies contemplated by Congress.
106. T. A. Sisto & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3614, Nov. 1, 1944.
107. Foelber-Patterson, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3847, Aug. 4, 1946.
108. Central Securities Corp., 11 S.E.C. 98 (1942).
109. Note 94 supra.
110. Lawrence R. Leeby & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3898, Jan. 6,
1947; accord, Sylvan Perry, Spies, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3900, Jan. 8,
1947.
I11.. Id. at p. 4. [Italics added].
112. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Incorporated, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3683,
April 18, 1945.
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(c) Continuance of Membership
No broker or dealer may remain a member of NASD while it has an
officer, director or employee who was "a cause" of the expulsion of a member,
unless the Commission approves or directs such continuance in membership.
One applicant sought to have the Commission permit an individual, who had
been previously expelled from NASD membership and who had later with-
drawn from registration, to engage in the securities business as a partner or
employee of the applicant. The Commission considered the nature of the past
violation, the penalty, the conduct of the individual subsequent to expulsion
and his general character. As the NASD had recommended favorable consid-
eration of the request and the staff of the Commission approved the applicant's
continuance in membership, the Commission approved the continuance in mem-
bership with such person acting either as a partner or employee.113
The Commission has permitted the use of a procedure whereby the firm
making application for such continuance in membership has not been required
to disclose publicly its identity.114 The Commission stated that it has been ad-
vised that the publicity of such a proceeding had had the effect of discouraging
NASD members from taking any steps to obtain approval of employment of
persons who would otherwise be disqualified. The Commission has on occasion
ordered the applicant's continuance in membership, noting that its disposition
of such request would also have the, effect of a ruling as to the individual's
status as a registered representative of the applicant. 1 5
CONCLUSION
Since its establishment, the Securities and Exchange Commission has ap-
parently accomplished much by its investigations and prosecution of the
various fraudulent activities which have been engaged in, in the over-the-
counter markets. It is perhaps undoubted that this public control of these se-
curities markets has insured a degree of investor protection which would have
never been achieved under unrestrained "free competition." However, the
very nature of the over-the-counter markets and the difficulty of determining
the "fair price" at which a dealer is permitted to sell securities, leads 'this
writer to believe that before maximum investor protection will be assured, it is
essential that all the securities which are dealt in in these markets must be
registered Nwith a national organized exchange. It is submitted that a national
113. NASD, Inc. (re Greene & Company), Securities Exchange Act Release No.
3836, July 31, 1946. .
114. NASD, Inc. (re John J. Bell), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4034,
Dec. 11, 1947.
115. NASD, Inc. (re Edward E. Trost), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3955,
April 29, '1947. Cf. NASD, Inc. (re Minnesota Securities Corporation), Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 4033, Dec. 11, 1947.
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securities exchange should be established for the registration and trading of
securities which are concurrently bought and sold exclusively in the over-the-
counter markets, exempting those securities which are dealt in exclusively in-
trastate; and with this additional device, the Commission will thereupon have
adequate authority to supervise these markets, which are currently referred to
by many as the "under-the-counter" markets. When the price trend of secur-
ities is again on the decline and the complaints of over-the-counter investors
have increased, then perhaps the Congress will feel that the time.is ripe for
this additional federal legislation.
L. Guy CL NTON
